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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the Great Recession, the federal government spent
hundreds of billions of dollars in tax and other interventions in the
labor market as part of the stimulus and follow-up policies.' Policy-
makers traditionally have based their policies on "Keynesian" theo-
ries that recessions are driven by inadequate demand, so that
increasing government spending will increase demand for economic
activity and workers. 2 However, these theories guide how much to
spend, not how to design the spending. As a result, despite this mas-
sive outlay of funds, the theory for the form that labor income taxes
and related policies should change during recessions is surprisingly
poorly developed. Instead of drawing on Keynesian macroeconomic
theories, we draw on the microeconomics literature on how labor mar-
kets function during recessions-in particular, the literature on match-
ing unemployed workers with firms.3 Insights from microeconomics
help answer why there are "too few" jobs and which workers gain
employment.
The Article draws two counterintuitive conclusions for maximizing
social welfare during slack labor markets during and after recessions.
First, subsidize nonemployment. This draws marginal workers out of
the labor force, creating space for those who really need jobs. Second,
subsidize employers for hiring, not the employees themselves. The
problem during recessions is having too few jobs. Econometric evi-
dence shows that statutory incidence matters for economic incidence
during recessions; subsidizing employers creates more jobs, while sub-
sidizing employees confers benefits on those who already won the job
lottery.4 Policy during and after the Great Recession often did not
follow these recommendations.
I See, e.g., Obama: Stimulus Lets Americans Claim Destiny, NBC News (Feb. 17, 2009,
7:50 PM), http://www.nbcnews.comlid/29231790/ns/politics-whitehouse/t/obama-stimulus-
lets-americans-claim-destiny/#.WD-LORSKBMp (describing a $787 billion program).
2 See David Romer, Advanced Macroeconomics 242-44 (3d ed. 2006) (providing a mod-
ern rendition of the Keynesian model). John Keynes originally developed Keynesian the-
ory. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
(1936).
3 See Robert Shimer, The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacan-
cies, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 25, 34-42, 44-45 (2005) (providing a prominent explanation of the
literature on matching in unemployment); see also Arthur J. Hosios, On the Efficiency of
Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment, 57 Rev. Econ. Stud. 279
(1990) (providing the same).
4 See James M. Poterba, Julio J. Rotemberg & Lawrence H. Summers, A Tax-Based Test
for Nominal Rigidities, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 659, 662-75 (1986) (providing econometric evi-
dence that statutory incidence matters for economic incidence during recessions). Statu-
tory incidence may also matter for economic incidence outside of recessions. See John J.
Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment
Spells, 99 Yale L.J. 549, 596-99 (1989).
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We base these recommendations on a novel model of the recession
economy that has two key features. First, jobs are rationed during
recessions. That is, the number of people willing to work substantially
exceeds the number of jobs available. Many economists believe that
the job rationing comes from the fact that wages fall little in recessions
even though demand for workers fall, generating more people who
wish to work than jobs to employ them.5 Whatever the cause, high
unemployment itself means that jobs must be rationed. Second, evi-
dence suggests that there is a substantial amount of randomness in
how jobs are rationed.6 That is, some people really value having a job,
and others do not, and there are likely insufficient mechanisms in
place to ensure that the high-surplus type of worker receives the job
over the low-surplus type of worker.7 For example, an individual with
a mortgage to pay, a nonworking spouse, and three children may re-
5 For economics papers arguing why rationing is an important feature of recessionary
economies because wages do not change quickly enough to stop the rationing, see Truman
F. Bewley, Why Wages Don't Fall During a Recession 1-19 (1999) (suggesting, based on
interviews with workers and management, that workers strongly dislike decreases in their
"nominal"-that is, noninflation-adjusted wage and that these decreases would decrease
morale and therefore productivity), and John B. Taylor, Staggered Wage Setting in a
Macro Model, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 108, 109-10, 112 (1979) (explaining that
wage stickiness, both upward and downward, results from the fact that firms cannot fully
adjust wages if competitors are not adjusting theirs at the same time because of staggered
wage-setting). Bewley's work builds in part on that of George Akerlof. George A.
Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. Econ. 543, 543-45 (1982) (sug-
gesting that norms may matter in wage-setting). Recent prominent macroeconomic mod-
els have included these wage rigidities. See Robert E. Hall, Employment Fluctuations with
Equilibrium Wage Stickiness, 95 Am. Econ. Rev. 50, 50-51 (2005) (incorporating sticky
wages into a search model, but assuming that the sticky wages merely adjust the division of
surplus and do not generate layoffs, contrary to our model); Robert Shimer, The Conse-
quences of Rigid Wages in Search Models, 2 J. Eur. Econ. Ass'n 469, 476-79 (2004) (adding
wage rigidities to a search model with stochastic shocks and finding that, if all wages are
inflexible, the model does a better job of predicting the dynamics of employment through-
out business cycles, but finding that the welfare costs of the business cycle are still low);
Robert Shimer, Convergence in Macroeconomics: The Labor Wedge, 1 Am. Econ. J.:
Macroeconomics 280, 295-96 (2009) (arguing that wage rigidities, combined with search
frictions, are a promising possible explanation for unemployment during recessions). But
see Christopher A. Pissarides, The Unemployment Volatility Puzzle: Is Wage Stickiness
the Answer?, 77 Econometrica 1339, 1366 (2009) (arguing that wage rigidities cannot ex-
plain unemployment during recessions). This literature does not include heterogeneous
reservation wages, which we explore.
6 See Part VI (presenting the evidence); see also Bewley, note 5, at 238-41 (showing that
firms do not appear to account for how much employees value jobs in layoff decisions); id.
at 341-47 (showing that more effort put into looking for a job often does result in getting a
job).
7 The implications of heterogeneous worker surplus have been explored in other con-
texts. See, e.g., Christian Bontemps, Jean-Marc Robin & Gerard J. Van den Berg, An
Empirical Equilibrium Job Search Model with Search on the Job and Heterogeneous
Woikers and Firms, 40 Int'l Econ. Rev. 1039 (1999) (studying the implications of heteroge-
neous worker surplus on equilibrium wage dispersion, that is, how wages for similar jobs
vary).
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ally need a job; this is a high-surplus worker.8 If rationing is ineffi-
cient, then this inefficient rationing, not the shortage of jobs per se, is
the much bigger cause of social welfare loss in the economy.
These two features of the recessionary economy generate the two
policy recommendations. With randomness in rationing, one key con-
cern is ensuring that the right type of person receives the jobs, gener-
ating the first recommendation of subsidizing nonemployment to
encourage marginal workers to leave the labor force and create space
for high-valuation workers. Likewise, with rationing, another key
concern is creating more jobs, not subsidizing existing workers, gener-
ating the second recommendation of subsidizing employers for em-
ploying workers, not the employees themselves. The reason is that,
with rationing, statutory incidence matters,9 and subsidizing hiring en-
courages employers to hire, whereas subsidizing the employee-side
does not increase the number of jobs available and does not increase
employment. Asking how these features of recessions should affect
policy is new. We describe how taxes should be affected, along with
other policies, like unemployment insurance, public hiring, and em-
ployer mandates.10
Though the model does not capture all relevant factors, its limita-
tions generally do not qualitatively affect the policy recommendations.
Perhaps most importantly, this microeconomic model does not con-
sider the Keynesian macroeconomic goal of increasing aggregate de-
mand. The best estimates of the macroeconomic stimulus of the
relevant policies, however, suggest that the policies recommended in
this Article are actually some of the best for macroeconomic stimulus,
so there is no tension between the recommendations of
microeconomics and macroeconomics. 11 Additionally, while of course
there are mechanisms by which those who really want jobs are dispro-
portionately able to get them and in which wages are not perfectly
sticky, as long as substantial unemployment remains and as long as a
8 There are many reasons that individuals may vary in their surplus from work. For
example, some may particularly fear long-term earnings losses due to long-term unemploy-
ment resulting from being unemployed (related to "hysteresis," or increased unemploy-
ment resulting from prolonged periods of unemployment during economic shocks). See
Steven J. Davis & Till von Wachter, Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss, Brookings
Papers on Econ. Activity 1, 1 (2011) (providing evidence on long-term earning losses re-
sulting from being laid off during recessions).
9 See note 4.
10 See Section V.D.
11 Policies for Increasing Economic Growth and Employment in 2012 and 2013 Before
the Comm. on the Budget 28 tbl.1 (Nov. 15, 2011) (statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf,
Director, Cong. Budget Office), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/
11-15-OutlookStimulusTestimony.pdf (showing that the policies recommended by the
Article also have high macroeconomic multipliers). For further explanation, see Section
VI.
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substantial number of people who really want jobs are unable to get
them, the results hold qualitatively. Of course, this Article presents a
stylized model, and the magnitude of the appropriate policy response
depends on empirical estimates that are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. The Article's goal is to shift policy in the direction of its
recommendations.
Policy during the Great Recession was mixed in its adherence to the
Article's two recommendations. The first recommendation-of subsi-
dizing nonemployment-was followed by Congress. 12 However, de-
spite interest in policies consistent with this Article, the second
recommendation-of subsidizing employers, not employees-was
largely not followed. 13 To the contrary, a policy commonly used dur-
ing this and other recessions, employee-side payroll tax rebates, 1 4
draws marginal workers into the labor force, decreasing social welfare
by encouraging people who value work relatively little to join the
competition for a fixed number of jobs that otherwise would have
been sought only by people who more highly value working.
II. CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE
This Article contributes to several literatures. First, this Article
contributes to the renewed interest in how taxes and spending should
change during recessions, in light of the aftermath of the Great Reces-
sion. Prominent economists have noted that research in this area is
sorely needed.15 Lawyers have started the project of understanding
how tax laws should change during recessions. In particular, Yair Lis-
tokin makes a forceful argument that the lack of macroeconomic con-
siderations in tax law is quite problematic. 16 Others have begun
understanding how features of the Code, like the alternative minimum
tax,17 soften the blow of recessions and how they could do an even
better job of serving that goal.' 8 Others have considered how unem-
12 See Section VIII.A.
13 See Section VIII.B.
14 Jeanne Sahadi, Tax Rebates: Where's Your Check?, CNN Money (Jan. 19, 2008, 1:18
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/01/18/news/economy/rebatehowitworks/in-
dex.htm?postversion=2008011812 (describing payroll tax rebates).
15 Alan J. Auerbach, Implementing the New Fiscal Policy Activism, 99 Am. Econ. Rev.
(Papers & Proc.) 543, 548 (2009) ("[I]f we are going to practice fiscal discretionary policy
on a large scale, then more attention to policy design is sorely needed.").
16 Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics
for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 Yale J. on Reg. 45, 88-89 (2012).
17 IRC § 55(a).
18 Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative
Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 187, 210-23 (2010).
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ployment insurance should vary over the business cycle. 19 This is the
first Article that considers the implications of efficient and inefficient
job rationing on the choice between subsidizing employers, employ-
ees, and nonemployment.
Second, this Article is part of a broader reassessment of the implica-
tions for tax law when traditional assumptions on the invariance of
statutory incidence for economic incidence do not hold.20 That is, in a
Coase-like way, economists traditionally have believed that it does not
matter who actually remits a tax in determining who actually ends up
paying for the tax after all price changes have been taking into ac-
count.21 For example, Wojciech Kopczuk, Justin Marion, Erich
Muehlegger, and Joel Slemrod show that the point of collection mat-
ters for the incidence of state diesel taxes due to evasion.22 Most rele-
vant for this Article, James Poterba, Julio Rotemberg, and Lawrence
Summers show that the statutory incidence of taxes does matter for
economic incidence during recessions. 23 This Article applies these
econometric results about the importance of statutory incidence to
draw conclusions about tax law and shows a context in which standard
assumptions about incidence are misguided-and therefore may be
leading to bad policies, like subsidizing workers instead of their
employers.
Third, we apply to a new context the theory on inefficient rationing.
Since at least the 1940's, scholars have recognized that regulations
such as rent control prevent the efficient allocation of demanders to
suppliers.24 More recently, scholars have studied the inefficiencies of
misallocation of workers and jobs in the context of the minimum
19 Camille Landais, Pascal Michaillat & Emmanuel Saez, A Macroeconomic Theory of
Optimal Unemployment Insurance 5-8, 47-48 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 16526, 2010), www.nber.org/papers/wl6526 (finding that unemployment insurance
should be more generous during recessions, but based on a model that assumes that all
workers value work the same amount and also not studying the choice between taxing
employees or subsidizing employers or other forms of subsidizing nonemployment); see
Kory Kroft & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, Should Unemployment Insurance Vary with the
Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence, 83 Rev. Econ. Stud. 1092, 1121-22 (2016)
(finding similar results).
20 See note 4.
21 Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability, 63
Tax L. Rev. 797, 798-99 (2010).
22 Wojciech Kopczuk, Justin Marion, Erich Muehlegger & Joel Slemrod, Does Tax-Col-
lection Invariance Hold? Evasion and the Pass-Through of State Diesel Taxes, 8 Am.
Econ. J.: Econ. Pol'y 251 (2016); see Donohue, note 4, at 554, 569 (discussing the distribu-
tion prediction when bonuses are paid to either workers or employers).
23 Poterba et al., note 4, at 662-75.
24 Milton Friedman & George J. Stigler, Roofs or Ceilings? The Current Housing Prob-
lem, 1 Popular Essays on Current Probs. 7, 16-20 (1946).
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wage. 25 Studies from the gasoline, rental housing, and natural gas
markets provide good evidence that regulation causes misallocation.26
We build in particular on earlier theoretical work by Edward Glaeser
and Erzo Luttmer, who develop welfare analysis for the efficiency of
rationing in rent-controlled housing market.27 We apply this theory
for the first time to the context of labor markets during recessions 28
and make the point that the market can exhibit the same problems on
its own that result from price regulations-and that similar policy so-
lutions can apply.
Finally, this Article contributes to the nascent discourse on behav-
ioral tax law.2 9 In particular, it explores the implications for tax policy
of the most-touted explanation for wage stickiness, norms within firms
that prevent wages from decreasing during recessions.30 This Article
combines these nonstandard preferences with their effects on the
macroeconomy to develop new implications for tax law.
III. MODEL OF THE REcEssIONARY EcONoMY
In this Part, we develop a basic model of a recessionary economy;
policy implications follow in later Parts. To make the insights most
transparent, we keep the math to a minimum and relegate the details
to the Appendix. Following Glaeser and Luttmer in their discussion
25 See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr., Nontransferable Rents and an Unrecognized Social Cost of
Minimum Wage Laws, 11 J. Lab. Res. 453, 453-56 (1990).
26 See Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Does the Minimum Wage Cause Inefficient Rationing?, 7 B.E.
J. Econ. Analysis & Pol'y: Contributions to Econ. Analysis & Pol'y, no. 1, 2007, at 2 (re-
viewing empirical evidence of misallocation due to regulation).
27 Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F.P. Luttmer, The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent
Control, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1027, 1027-30 (2003). A later paper by Luttmer develops a
test for the efficiency of rationing in the minimum wage labor market using a test that is
conceptually similar; he studies how the demographics of the workforce change as the min-
imum wage changes, under the principle that a higher minimum wage leads to more ration-
ing and that some demographics are correlated with reservation wage. Luttmer, note 26, at
2-4, 7-18, 31-32.
28 David Lee and Emmanuel Saez explore optimal minimum wage policy if the social
planner values redistribution, where rationing is efficient and inefficient. David Lee &
Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Minimum Wage Policy in Competitive Labor Markets, 96 J. Pub.
Econ. 739, 739-40 (2012).
29 See, e.g., Behavioral Public Finance (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006)
(reviewing recent developments in behavioral economics and their implications for public
finance); Jacob Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience, 16 Am. L. & Econ. Rev.
144, 145-50 (2014) (describing issues that arise in tax when tax expenditures may be less
salient than other expenditures); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1476, 1546 (1998)
(describing how behavioral economics should change policy recommendations in law and
economics generally).
30 See Bewley, note 5, at 1-19 (providing interview-based evidence on the dislike of
nominal wage decreases); Akerlof, note 5, at 543-45 (developing foundational theory on
norms in labor markets).
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of rent control, we consider a model with linear labor demand and
supply, with labor demand given by PD = bD - MDQ and labor supply
given by P = bs + msQ. 31 We also assume that employment is binary:
Workers are either employed or not employed; there are no part-time
jobs or adjustment to the number of hours worked. Workers have
identical productivity but heterogeneous surplus from work (the dif-
ference between the actual wage level and the lowest wage level at
which an individual is willing to work, which is known as the "reserva-
tion wage"). 32
Suppose that, because a recession has just begun and wages are
sticky, the wage level is some amount 0 greater than the efficient mar-
ket-clearing price (P*).33 We do not explore the possible causes of the
stickiness, instead accepting at face value the commonly held view
that wages must be somewhat sticky to generate such large fluctua-
tions in employment during business cycles. 34 For example, interviews
of managers by economist Truman Bewley show that "[m]ost manag-
ers were astonished by the idea of offering as an alternative to layoff
continued work on the same job at reduced pay."35 This could be be-
cause morale would be harmed too much if wages were lowered, 36
because employers cannot coordinate in lowering wages,37 or other
reasons.38 Effectively, the labor demand curve has shifted down, but
wages do not adjust fully. As shown in Figure 1, Qs workers are will-
31 Glaeser & Luttmer, note 27.
32 See Alan 0. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 Colum.
L. Rev. 199, 232 n.117 (1989) (defining reservation wage).
33 As noted above, this assumption is common in the economics literature. See note 6
and accompanying text. It is also supported by the interviews conducted by Bewley.
Bewley, note 5, at 241-43 (noting that no companies offered "choice between layoff and
continued work on the same job at lower pay"). Of course, none of this is to say that firms
never cut wages. See Barbara Kiviat, When Companies Opt for Pay Cuts Instead of Lay-
offs, Time, Apr. 27, 2009 (providing examples of companies that cut wages).
3 See David Romer, Real Rigidities, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Steven
N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008), http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.
com/article?id=pde2008 R000271; Shimer, note 3, at 30-32. Note that this view is not uni-
versally held. See, e.g., Martin Beraja, Erik Hurst & Juan Ospina, The Aggregate Implica-
tions of Regional Business Cycles 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
21956, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21956 (arguing that the contribution of wage
stickiness to unemployment is smaller than is generally believed); Mikhail Golosov & Rob-
ert E. Lucas Jr., Menu Costs and Phillips Curves, 115 J. Pol. Econ. 171, 171-73 (2007)
(expressing similar skepticism).
35 Bewley, note 5, at 243.
36 Id.
37 Taylor, note 5, at 109, 111-12.
38 Note that the problem of sticky wages persists even as many people come and go from
jobs. See 3 Steven J. Davis & John Haltiwanger, Gross Job Flows, in Handbook of Labor
Economics 2711 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (discussing the large
flows of people into and out of jobs, even when the total number of jobs is stable). New
hires are also affected by sticky wages, both to maintain intra-firm equity in wages between
old and new hires, and because firms offering new jobs are competing with employers
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2. Subsidizing Employees Is Welfare-Decreasing
Now consider a subsidy for employees, instead of employers-for
example, a cut in employee-side payroll taxes. This is exactly the op-
posite of Recommendation 1, subsidizing nonemployment, since sub-
sidies for employees make nonemployment less attractive, not more
attractive. This yields the following result:
R4: In the case of uniform rationing, a subsidy for employees de-
creases welfare.55
An employee-side subsidy reverses the analysis for subsidizing
nonemployment discussed in Section V.A and shown in Figure 4.
When workers decide whether to enter the labor market, they com-
pare their utility from entering the labor market with their utility from
exiting the labor market. Thus, this policy draws more marginal work-
ers into the labor force, by making working more attractive. How-
ever, it does not increase the number of jobs, like subsidizing
employers does. These marginal workers then compete with workers
who really need jobs, the opposite of what happens with the subsidy
for nonemployment. The presence in the labor market of workers
who care only a little about working makes it less likely that those
who really want to work will get hired at one of a fixed number of
jobs. Therefore, these tax cuts are counterproductive with uniform
rationing as they aggravate the allocative deadweight loss without re-
ducing the quantity deadweight loss.5 6 This result of subsidizing em-
ployers instead of employees resonates with the political debate
during the recession on the importance of "creating" more jobs; the
focus was not on helping out workers who already were lucky enough
to have jobs.
Of course, if increasing the returns to work does not in fact draw
workers to participate, then this point is moot. However, credible evi-
dence consistently shows substantial increases in participation when
the returns to working go up.5 7
55 Thus, the welfare loss from subsidizing an employee is simply the negative of the
welfare gain from subsidizing nonemployment. See the results in note 45.
56 Instead of subsidizing employees, the model actually implies that it is desirable to
increase taxes on employees. Of course, raising taxes during recessions is a bad idea for
macroeconomic reasons. If it were wise, though, taxing employees and subsidizing em-
ployers would effectively reduce the post-tax wage, removing the underlying source of
inefficiency and therefore reducing both allocative and quantity deadweight losses. Al-
though the market will not get the wage down, the government can effectively decrease it.
Such a policy is an alternative to inflation when the Federal Reserve already has interest
rates as low as they can go, which happened in the most recent recession.
57 See, e.g., Raj Chetty, Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis
of Micro and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply, 80 Econometrica 969, 1008 (2012) (re-
viewing the recent literature and finding that quasi-experimental estimates have an average
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3. Implementation
The two policies recommended here-subsidizing nonemployment
and subsidizing employers during recessions-could be enacted in at
least two ways. First, Congress could add "triggers" to the Code and
welfare programs in which these policies go into effect if unemploy-
ment passes a certain threshold, say 7%. Neither the Code nor wel-
fare programs currently contain such triggers. Such triggers would
have the advantage of coming into effect without delay from Con-
gress. They would have the disadvantage of potentially generating
perverse strategic behavior. For example, suppose that this trigger
policy has been adopted and the unemployment rate is creeping to-
ward 7% as an employer debates whether to hire a temporary em-
ployee now or in a few months. The employer may delay hiring new
employees until he can get a wage subsidy from the government, po-
tentially exacerbating the very problem the employer-side subsidies
are designed to solve.5 8 Alternatively, Congress could adopt new laws
as times of economic stress arise, as was done in the most recent reces-
sion. This policy has the advantage of allowing Congress to tailor the
policies to the specific contemporaneous circumstances, but the disad-
vantage of delay-or potentially no action at all.
4. Other Policy Levers
The stylized model has focused on tax and transfer policy-income
or payroll tax cuts, or changes in benefits like Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families and unemployment insurance. But this analysis
also has implications for the attractiveness of other policy levers. For
example, federal or state government hiring and layoff policy could be
altered during recessions to explicitly consider surplus from work.
Another implication might be to adjust the salience of the various sub-
sidies. The government could try to make potentially problematic em-
ployee-side subsidies less salient,59 while trying to make more
beneficial (by the argument in this Article) employer-side and nonem-
ployment subsidies more salient, to increase the behavioral response.
participation elasticity of 0.25). Note though that not every study finds substantial elastici-
ties; for example, one working paper finds very small labor force participation elasticities.
Robert McClelland, Shannon Mok & Kevin Pierce, Labor Force Participation Elasticities
of Women and Secondary Earners Within Married Couples 15 (Cong. Budget Office,
Working Paper No. 2014-06, 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/publication49433.
58 Congress could partially respond to the concern about employers' strategic behavior
by promising during its deliberations to make the subsidy retroactive.
59 Indeed, in a poll from February 2010, many reported that they believed that the
Obama administration had not cut taxes. Robert Henden, Poll Reveals Most Americans
Don't Know They Got a Tax Cut, CBS News (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/poll-reveals-most-americans-dont-know-they-got-a-tax-cut/.
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Similarly, recessions may be a particularly bad time to increase em-
ployers' costs of hiring workers-for example, through regulatory
mandates that are statutorily incident on employers. Rather, this
analysis suggests reasons (on the margin) to make new mandates stat-
utorily incident on employees during recessions to the extent possible,
or to delay new mandates.
The federal government could also encourage states to maintain
generous unemployment insurance through policy tweaks. Current
law requires states to repay the federal government for loans it pro-
vides for unemployment insurance within roughly two years of incur-
ring the loan,60 resulting in some states making unemployment
insurance less generous and/or raising taxes on firms while the labor
market was still slack.61 The federal government could reduce the
speed with which states are required to repay the federal government
or reduce the penalty for not repaying on the normal schedule, as the
Obama Administration proposed. 62 Doing so would encourage states
to maintain generous unemployment insurance and avoid increases in
the taxes that firms pay for workers, promoting both of the Article's
policy recommendations.
Finally, this analysis could be viewed as favorable toward work-
sharing arrangements, in which employees work for fewer hours, so
that more employees are employed. If there is a somewhat fixed num-
ber of hours worked, then work-sharing would at least allow some
high-surplus workers who are rationed of jobs to have some employ-
ment. Regulations such as those promulgated at the end of the
Obama administration to increase overtime pay,63 thereby discourag-
ing longer hours, could have de facto promoted such work-sharing.
VI. How EFFICIENT Is RATIONING?
In this Part, we argue that it is reasonable to think that job rationing
during recessions is inefficient. Though we describe uniform rationing
for analytical clarity, we think it unlikely that rationing is literally uni-
60 IRC § 3302(c)(2)(B), (d)(3) (reducing unemployment insurance tax credit for em-
ployers in states that do not repay loans by November tenth of the second year).
61 See Pamela Prah, Businesses Penalized for State Unemployment Insurance Debt,
Stateline (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/state-
line/2011/11/18lbusinesses-penalized-for-state-unemployment-insurance-debt.
62 Id. (explaining that the Obama Administration suggested suspending interest for two
years and delaying penalties for states that were struggling to repay their loans in the after-
math of the Great Recession).
63 Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32391 (May 23, 2016) (stayed by
Nevada et al. v. U.S. Dept. of Labor et al., No. 4:16-CV-00731) (E.D. Tex., Nov. 22, 2016)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
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form." Nevertheless, there are many reasons to expect inefficient ra-
tioning-that is, that it is not always the case that-within a class of
workers with similar productivity-those who most want jobs get
them. To understand how efficient rationing is during recessions, one
must consider the two main sources of unemployment-layoffs and
lack of hiring.65 Each can potentially have a different mechanism that
bears on the efficiency of rationing. We review each type in turn.
First, evidence suggests that how much workers value the job is not
a criterion considered by firms in making layoff decisions. In particu-
lar, when Bewley interviewed firms about their layoff decisions, there
was no evidence at all that this was a concern. 66 This apparent indif-
ference makes sense because firms care about productivity, not
worker surplus from work. Indeed, evidence from Bewley and others
confirms that productivity is an important criterion when considering
whom to lay off. 6 7 As well, even if firms did care, it would be difficult
for them to distinguish between workers with high and low surplus
from work; presumably, many workers would profess having a high
surplus in order to help them keep their jobs.68 Furthermore, in some
cases, firms do not even choose individual workers to lay off and in-
stead lay off whole divisions or close entire plants. In those cases, of
course, there can be no attention paid to worker surplus. Indeed,
Bewley concludes, "[d]espite the widespread use of the performance
criterion, the population of unemployed was probably not of low qual-
ity, for many firms laid off whole departments or large portions of
64 Measuring rationing efficiency is particularly challenging given the unobservability of
surplus from work. One approach to measuring surplus from work is using the amount
that individuals say that they value working (as in Martin Feldstein & James Poterba, Un-
employment Insurance and Reservation Wages, 23 J. Pub. Econ. 141 (1984)); however,
economists tend to be skeptical of such stated values, versus those that are revealed by
individuals' behavior. Moshe Ben-Akiva, Daniel McFadden & Kenneth Train, Foundations
of Stated Preference Elicitation: Consumer Behavior and Choice-Based Conjoint Analysis
(Mar. 2016), https://eml.berkeley.edu/-train/foundations.pdf (describing economists' typi-
cal skepticism of stated preferences).
65 In principle, people who quit but do not find employment could also be a part of
unemployment. However, evidence shows that the number of people quitting jobs actually
went down substantially during the recession, so quits are unlikely to play an important
role in cyclical unemployment. In contrast, layoffs increased substantially and the number
of job openings and the amount of hiring plummeted, making it harder to find jobs. See
Job Opening and Labor Turnover Point to (Slow) Recovery, EconompicData (Nov. 10,
2011, 8:08 AM), http://econompicdata.blogspot.com/2011/11/job-opening-and-labor-turn
over-point-to.html.
66 Bewley, note 5, at 235-38.
67 See, e.g., id.; Robert Gibbons & Lawrence Katz, Layoffs and Lemons, 9 J. Lab. Econ.
351 (1991) (confirming empirical predictions of a model in which low-productivity workers
are laid off when firms do not close whole plants and therefore have discretion over
layoffs).
68 Of course, family circumstances and other things may be observed, but these are
likely to be crude proxies.
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them." 69 Thus, the best evidence suggests that, on the layoff side, em-
ployer behavior does not undermine the assumption of uniform ra-
tioning; firms lay off whole plants or divisions or they pay attention to
productivity, not worker surplus.70
Evidence from the hiring side also suggests that inefficient rationing
may be rampant. As with layoffs, there is little evidence that firms
considered workers' surplus in hiring. Bewley's research reveals no
attempt to hire those with higher surplus from work.71 Of course, em-
ployers may be doing so without knowing it, but it remains unlikely
that employee surplus is fully taken into account. There is also a sec-
ond side to hiring-worker effort into getting hired. Likely, the abil-
ity of workers who have a higher surplus from employment to work
hard at getting a job partly undoes part of what otherwise might be
inefficient rationing. However, the evidence from Bewley and others
suggests that even significant search effort or flexibility by the unem-
ployed often did not yield a job during a recession. 72
Indeed, though not framed as inefficient job rationing, the kind of
luck that generates inefficient rationing is implicit in a great deal of
economic modeling on how workers search for jobs. Although these
models range from quite simple73 to very complex,74 all recognize that
in finding (and often losing) a job, there is an element of chance.75
Plants close, interviews go poorly, unlucky social networks of friends,
and stochastic rapport between interviewer and firm all cause other-
wise identical individuals to face different outcomes in the labor mar-
ket. In fact, there is a large empirical literature suggesting that
69 Bewley, note 5, at 238.
70 Some firms also lay off in reverse seniority, which also is unlikely to closely corre-
spond to workers' surplus from work. Id. at 236, 238.
71 Id. at 277-302.
72 Id. at 341 ("I asked whether people could find work quickly if they were sufficiently
flexible and energetic in their job search. The answer was usually an emphatic 'no.' Re-
spondents claimed that the general shortage of jobs and the overqualification problem
made finding a job of any type a long, difficult process, though some job hunters were
lucky. The shortage of jobs relative to the number of job seekers preoccupied advisers of
the unemployed. . . . All but one of [eighteen interviewed advisers] said it normally took a
long time to find work, even if job searchers were energetic and completely flexible."); see
also Alan B. Krueger & Andreas Mueller, Job Search and Unemployment Insurance: New
Evidence from Time Use Data 24 (Inst. for the Study of Labor (IZA), Discussion Paper
No. 3667, 2008), http://anon-ftp.iza.org/dp3667.pdf (finding in the most basic model that
"increasing [job] search by one hour increases the probability of finding a job by 0.31 per-
centage points," which the authors consider "small").
73 See, e.g., John McCall, Economics of Information and Job Search, 84 Q.J. Econ. 113
(1970).
74 See, e.g., Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with
Worker and Employer Heterogeneity, 70 Econometrica 2295 (2002) (taking into account
worker and firm heterogeneity).
75 See McCall, note 73, at 115-17; Postel-Vinay & Robin, note 74, at 2300-01.
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workers who lose their jobs for plausibly exogenous reasons, such as
firm closures, experience substantially worse labor market out-
comes.76 This literature emphasizes that there is a random component
to labor market outcomes. The model rests on the assumption that
finding and keeping a job is partly a random process.
Additional support for inefficient job rationing during recessions
comes from the problematic results when one assumes that there is no
inefficient job rationing. Famously, Nobel laureate Robert Lucas built
an economic model that found that recessions should have only small
consequences for social welfare.77 That is, aggregate happiness should
not be affected much by recessions. This conclusion may not fit with
intuitions that recessions are very important and cause great hardship
and definitely does not fit with the political attention afforded reces-
sions. A key part of the reason for his conclusion is that all members
of the economy are identical in Lucas' model, removing the possibility
that some individuals who particularly would like to work are not able
to.7 8 Thus, implicitly assuming efficient rationing helps lead to results
that seem wrong.
Finally, one potential critique of the existence of inefficient ration-
ing is that workers and employers should take advantage of the Coase
theorem to arrive a mutually-beneficial bargain. For example, among
similar workers, those with high surplus could pay workers with low
surplus to resign, "leaving a space" for the high-surplus worker in the
face of layoffs. Or an unemployed high-surplus individual could pay
an unemployed low-surplus individual not to apply for a rationed job.
Bewley observed no such bargains,79 and we can find no evidence that
others do either. Social norms or coordination failures might prevent
side deals that otherwise might take place. Alternatively, it could be
that one worker could pay another to quit, but that the quitter may
save another person's job, not that of he who paid. That is, coordinat-
ing side payments may be difficult.
Altogether then, while not suggesting that rationing is literally uni-
form, the evidence suggests a lot of reason to expect inefficient
rationing.
76 See, e.g., Louis S. Jacobson, Robert J. LaLonde & Daniel G. Sullivan, Earnings
Losses of Displaced Workers, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 685, 685-86 (1993).
77 Robert Lucas, Models of Business Cycles 105 (1987).
78 Lucas also implicitly assumes that every individual has perfect insurance against fluc-
tuations in income. See id. at 67-68; see also Alan S. Blinder, Keynes, Lucas, and Scientific
Progress, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 130, 131-32 (1987). Combining heterogene-
ous surplus from work and inefficient rationing together provides a reason that imperfect
insurance would yield particularly large welfare losses: Some of those losing jobs (and
therefore consumption) during recessions are those most in need.
79 See Bewley, note 5, at 218-62.
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VII. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
The model developed in this Article is, of course, limited by its as-
sumptions. Even looking outside the model, however, other consider-
ations are generally supportive of the Article's conclusions. One
important consideration outside of this model is the policy's effect on
aggregate demand.s0 In particular, one might be concerned that subsi-
dizing employers instead of employees would put money in the hands
of those who are less likely to spend it (that is, they have a lower
"marginal propensity to consume"), resulting in less spending and
therefore less aggregate demand, harming economic recovery. Fortu-
nately, the best evidence suggests that the growth effects of the poli-
cies recommended here are also policies with large effects on
aggregate demand.81 In particular, among the thirteen options consid-
ered by the Congressional Budget Office for increasing economic
growth in the aftermath of the Great Recession, the two with the larg-
est impact on GDP per dollar of spending were increasing aid to the
unemployed (expected to increase GDP by $1.15 per dollar of spend-
ing), a form of subsidizing nonemployment, and reducing employers'
payroll taxes (expected to increase GDP by $0.75 per dollar of spend-
ing), a hiring subsidy for employers. 82 Reducing employees' payroll
taxes, thereby subsidizing employment on the employee side, was ex-
pected to have a smaller impact, at $0.50 per dollar of spending.83
Thus, the concern that increasing employment and making sure that
the right employees are employed would harm economic growth ap-
pears to be unfounded based on the best available evidence.
The so-called "social costs of queueing" is a second factor not con-
sidered in the preceding analysis; it bolsters the first policy recommen-
dation of subsidizing nonemployment. 84 Suppose that when jobs are
over-subscribed, anyone who wishes to gain employment must partici-
pate in a lottery and pay some fixed cost like waiting in line, inter-
80 For a useful summary of recent theory on Keynesian economic policies, see Jordi
Gali, Modern Perspectives on Fiscal Stabilization Policies, 51 CESifo Econ. Stud. 587
(2005) (summarizing the New Keynesian perspective on increasing aggregate demand in
recessions).
81 See Elmendorf, note 11, at 28 tbl.1. The table actually gives ranges. We take the
average of the top and bottom of the range. A later CBO report backs up the conclusion
that transfer payments to individuals, including unemployment compensation, have large
macroeconomic impacts. Cong. Budget Office, Estimated Impact of the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output in 2014, at 6 (2015),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/49958-ARRA.pdf.
8 Elmendorf, note 11, at 28 tbl.1.
83 Id. Perhaps part of the reason that the CBO makes these findings is the significant
amount of stress businesses were under, perhaps increasing the likelihood that they would
spend the money rather than save it.
84 For a discussion of the economic effects of queueing, see Yoram Barzel, A Theory of
Rationing by Waiting, 17 J.L. & Econ. 73 (1974).
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viewing, or mailing applications. On the one hand, these costs can
decrease deadweight loss by ensuring that extremely marginal individ-
uals do not bother applying. On the other hand, the more people
spending time applying for a fixed number of jobs, the more social
waste results from the queueing process. A program to subsidize
nonemployment through unemployment or welfare payments could
reduce these costs by reducing the extent to which jobs are over-sub-
scribed; as such, the above analysis may actually understate the value
of nonemployment subsidies.
A third relevant factor not considered in the model is the distortion
to behavior that results from the government's need to raise funds to
pay for government programs. Of course, this factor does not alter
the recommendation of subsidizing firms instead of workers, since
both take revenue. However, it does affect the value of subsidizing
nonemployment.85 In particular, if we added considerations of the
costs of taxation, the cost of subsidizing employers and nonemploy-
ment would be understated.
A fourth factor is distribution between richer and poorer people-
for example, if one believes that a dollar in the hands of a poor person
is better than a dollar in the hands of a rich person, ceteris paribus.
This goal may partially undermine the recommendation of cutting em-
ployer-side, rather than employee-side taxes, since employers may be
richer than employees, and the gains may disproportionately stick
with the employers. On the other hand, this goal reinforces the rec-
ommendation of subsidizing nonemployment, since the nonemployed
tend to be poor. One interpretation of the Article is, holding distribu-
tional concerns fixed, the recommendations suggest shifting toward
subsidies for nonemployment and hiring subsidies instead of em-
ployee tax cuts.
Of course, the model ignores other potentially important considera-
tions, including hiring and firing costs, heterogeneity across sectors of
the economy, the possibility of targeting based on observables, 86 and
potential long-term impacts on labor force participation and economic
efficiency.87 The model assumes a fixed wage; to the extent that work-
85 Note that this cost would be the same under efficient and inefficient sorting.
86 For a discussion of targeted hiring credits, see David Neumark, Spurring Job Creation
in Response to Severe Recessions: Reconsidering Hiring Credits, 32 J. Pol'y Analysis &
Mgmt. 142, 150-58 (2013).
8 As to dynamics, one might be concerned that a subsidy for nonemployment that dis-
courages marginal workers from taking jobs could exacerbate the problem of hysteresis, in
which a period of high unemployment during a recession leads to higher unemployment
after the recession. For a brief introduction to hysteresis, see Lawrence Ball & N. Gregory
Mankiw, The NAIRU in Theory and Practice, J. Econ. Persp., Autumn 2002, at 115, 119-
20. There is mixed evidence as to whether hysteresis really exists, but in any case subsi-
dizing nonemployment is unlikely to substantially exacerbate hysteresis because it would
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ers' wages respond to the reservation wage, fall in a recession, or
change with subsidies, the results will be less relevant. Indeed, we
think it unlikely that wages are literally sticky in a way that makes a
tax cut on employers entirely incident on them or that employment is
literally rationed uniformly. However, so long as wages are somewhat
sticky, the side of the labor market that receives tax cuts matters, and,
as long as a substantial number of workers who really want jobs are
unable to get them and workers remain attentive to incentives, draw-
ing marginal workers out of the labor force will create space for those
who really need jobs.
VIII. ASSESSMENT OF POLICIES DURING THE GREAT RECESSION
A. Congress Subsidized Nonermployment
The first policy recommendation implied by the analysis is that sub-
sidies on the nonemployed should go up during recessions. Congress
followed this recommendation. Most importantly, Congress repeat-
edly extended increases in the generosity of unemployment insur-
ance.88 At an estimated cost of $39 billion, the approximately $800
billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (also known as the
Obama stimulus or the "Recovery Act") increased weekly unemploy-
ment payouts by $25, suspended income taxation on the first $2,400 of
benefits in 2009, and extended the duration of unemployment insur-
not substantially decrease the number of people employed, since the premise of the pro-
gram is that there is a (relatively) fixed number of jobs available. Another concern is that
subsidizing firms to hire might reduce the positive "cleansing" function of recessions, in
which low-productivity employees are laid off, ultimately benefitting the economy. Again
the evidence on whether this phenomenon exists is unclear, but this is also unlikely to be a
substantial issue because-even if there is some beneficial cleansing-the only workers
saved from being laid off by virtue of a hiring subsidy are the marginal workers. And
unless one believes that the full costs of job loss are worth bearing, then reducing job loss
from marginal workers should be unproblematic. More importantly, by far the larger
change during the Great Recession was in reductions in hiring, not increases in layoffs, and
only the latter could lead to beneficial cleansing. See Job Opening, note 65. And, in any
case, the best evidence suggests that the Great Recession caused less cleansing than earlier
recessions, suggesting that the issue may be moot. See Lucia Foster, Cheryl Grim & John
Haltiwanger, Reallocation in the Great Recession: Cleansing or Not?, 34 J. Lab.
Econ. S293, S297 (2016).
88 Julie M. Whittaker & Katelin P. Isaacs, Cong. Research Serv., RL34340, Extending
Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions 24-26 (2014) (listing the nu-
merous extensions of unemployment insurance through 2013) [hereinafter Extending Un-
employment Compensation]; Julie M. Whittaker & Katelin P. Isaacs, Cong. Research
Serv., RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benefits 13-19 (Feb. 12, 2014)
(on unemployment insurance extension through nearly the end of 2013) [hereinafter Un-
employment Insurance].
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ance by 13 weeks.89 Benefits similar to these were extended through
shortly before the end of 2013.90 Evidence suggests that these unem-
ployment extensions did, indeed, keep people out of the labor force.91
The Recovery Act included many other provisions effectively subsi-
dizing nonemployment as well. First, the Recovery Act increased the
subsidies for health insurance through former employers for the un-
employed (known as "COBRA")," at an estimated cost of $25 bil-
lion. 9 3 The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and other
expenditures to pay for food for very low-income or unemployed indi-
viduals were also expanded, at a cost of over $20 billion,94 thereby
further easing nonemployment. 95 Likewise, the Recovery Act in-
cluded funding for states to maintain their cash "welfare" Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families payments, estimated at a cost of $18.5
billion.96 Finally, the Recovery Act provided an estimated $88 billion
in funding for state governments, conditioned on their maintaining the
standards in Medicaid, the program that provides health care to low-
income individuals, many of whom were not employed.9 7
89 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 2001-06,
123 Stat. 115, 436-46. For a description, see Clinton T. Brass, Carol Hardy Vincent, Pamela
J. Jackson, Jennifer E. Lake, Karen Spar & Robert Keith, Cong. Research Serv., R40537,
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5): Summary and Legislative
History 29 (2009), and Whittaker & Isaacs, Extending Unemployment Compensation, note
88, at 24.
90 Whittaker & Isaacs, Unemployment Insurance, note 88, at 13. On the expiration of
benefits at the end of 2013, see Ed O'Keefe, Unemployment Benefits Dominate the
Agenda, Wash. Post (Jan. 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/unemploy
ment-benefits-dominate-the-agenda/2014/01/31/3a63a70a-8659-11e3-b85b-b305db87fb90
story.html.
91 See Rothstein et al., note 46, at 190.
9 Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272,§ 10001-02, 100 Stat. 82, 222-37.
93 Recovery Act, note 89, § 3001, 123 Stat. at 455-56. For a description, see Brass et al.,
note 89, at 29, 32-33.
94 Recovery Act, note 89, § 101, 123 Stat. at 120-21. For a description, see Brass et al.,
note 89, at 14.
95 See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Eligi-
bility, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility (last visited July 30, 2017) (describing condi-
tions for eligibility).
96 Recovery Act, note 89, §§ 2101-04, 123 Stat. at 446-49. For a description, see Brass et
al., note 89, at 31. For the origin of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, see Ctr. on
Budget & Pol'y Priorities, Policy Basics: An Introduction to TANF (June 15, 2015), https://
www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf.
9 Recovery Act, note 89, §§ 5000-08, 123 Stat. at 496-512. For a description, see Brass
et al., note 89, at 35, 45. See also Cliff Binder, Evelyne P. Baumrucker, April Grady &
Elicia J. Herz, Cong. Research Serv., R40223, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5): Title V, Medicaid Provisions (2009).
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B. Congress Did the Opposite of Subsidizing Employers, Not
Employees
Policy during the recession was inconsistent with the second policy
recommendation, to subsidize employers instead of employees. Evi-
dence suggests that employer-side subsidies in difficult economies do
substantially increase employment. 98  Nevertheless, although Presi-
dent Obama at least twice proposed substantial credits to employers
for hiring new workers,99 Congress only enacted two tiny and one
small credits. The tiny credits were in the Recovery Act and provided
an estimated $231 million 0 0 in tax credits for hiring unemployed vet-
erans and unskilled younger workers, 101 as well as a program provid-
ing funds for state welfare agencies to subsidize jobs for welfare
recipients that cost $1.32 billion.102 The small credit came in the Hir-
ing Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, enacted in March
98 See Jeffrey M. Perloff & Michael L. Wachter, The New Jobs Tax Credit: An Evalua-
tion of the 1977-78 Wage Subsidy Program, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 173, 178-
79 (1979). But see Lawrence F. Katz, Wage Subsidies for the Disadvantaged, in Generat-
ing Jobs: How to Increase Demand for Less-Skilled Workers 21, 22-23, 46-49 (Richard P.
Freeman & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1998) (expressing optimism, but somewhat more uncer-
tainty, about the impacts of wage subsidies for disadvantaged workers).
99 The first was a campaign promise that "[d]uring 2009 and 2010, existing businesses
will receive a $3,000 refundable tax credit for each additional full-time employee hired."
Press Release, Obama for America, Barack Obama and Joe Biden: A Rescue Plan for the
Middle Class (Oct. 13, 2008), 2008 TNT 200-36, Oct. 15, 2008, LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
Second, in January 2010, President Obama proposed the Small Business Jobs and Wages
Tax Cut, which would provide business with "a $5,000 tax credit for every net new em-
ployee that they employ in 2010," capped at $500,000 per firm and with half the tax credit
allowed for start-ups. Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec'y, President
Obama to Propose New Small Business Jobs and Wages Tax Cut (Jan. 28, 2010), https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-propose-new-small-busi-
ness-jobs-and-wages-tax-cut. It also would have reimbursed "[s]mall businesses that in-
crease[d] wages or hours for their existing employees . . . for the Social Security payroll
taxes they pa[id] on real increases in their payrolls." Id. Firms would have been "able to
claim the credit on a quarterly basis, . . . [to get] money out to businesses quickly and
provide[] and [sic] early incentive to hire and increase payrolls." Id.
100 Rep. Charles B. Rangel, House Ways & Means Comm. & Sen. Max Baucus, Senate
Fin. Comm., The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, February 12, 2009,
Full Summary of Provisions from Senate Finance, House Ways & Means Committees (Feb.
12, 2009), 2009 TNT 28-34, Feb. 13, 2009, LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
101 Recovery Act, note 89, § 1221, 123 Stat. at 337-38. For a description of the provision,
see Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Offers Tax Credit Guidance to Businesses Hiring Unem-
ployed Veterans and Certain Youth (May 28, 2009), http://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Offers-
Tax-Credit-Guidance-to-Businesses-Hiring-Unemployed-Veterans-and-Certain-Youth.
102 The funding came through the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Emergency
Fund. Recovery Act, note 89, § 2101, 123 Stat. at 446-49; Elizabeth Lower-Basch, Rethink-
ing Work Opportunity: From Tax Credits to Subsidized Job Placements, Big Ideas for Job
Creation 1, 3 (2011), http://aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-BigIdeasforJobCreationRethink-
ingWorkOpportunity-2011.pdf. There have also been various extensions of the Work Op-
portunity Tax Credit, which provides subsidized employment for targeted groups, but there
was not an expansion during or after the Great Recession. See id. at 1, 5.
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2010, which provided an estimated $13 billion in subsidies to employ-
ers who hired certain previously unemployed workers. 103 Overall
then hiring subsidies constituted a very small share of the approxi-
mately $1 trillion spent during and after the Recovery Act. 10 4
Instead, Congress passed policies contrary to the recommendations
in this Article. In particular, Congress passed employee-side payroll
tax reductions. The Recovery Act included the Making Work Pay Tax
Credit, a refundable tax credit of up to $400 for individuals and $800
for married couples in 2009 and 2010.105 The credit was available up
to 6.2% of earned income and phased out for high-income tax pay-
ers.106 The credit was estimated to cost $116.2 billion, about ten times
the estimated cost of the HIRE Act. 07 Furthermore, similar tax re-
ductions were extended into 2011,108 at an estimated cost of $112 bil-
lion' 09 and into 2012 at a similar cost.11 0 Thus, the $13 billion in
103 Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71
(2010). The Act provided two benefits to employers: "The first, referred to as the payroll
tax exemption, provides employers with an exemption from the employer's 6.2 percent
share of social security tax on wages paid to qualifying employees, effective for wages paid
from March 19, 2010 through December 31, 2010. In addition, for each qualified employee
retained for at least 52 consecutive weeks, businesses will also be eligible for a general
business tax credit, referred to as the new hire retention credit, of 6.2 percent of wages paid
to the qualified employee over the 52 week period, up to a maximum credit of $1,000."
Internal Revenue Serv., HIRE Act: Questions and Answers for Employers, http://
www.in.gov/sboa/files/Hoff HIREAct.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on
Fin., Baucus Hails Final Passage of Job-Creation Legislation (Mar. 17, 2010), https://
www.finance.senate.gov/imo/medialdoc/prb03l7lO.pdf.
104 See Cong. Budget office, note 81, at 1 (estimating that the Recovery Act will increase
budget deficits by $840 billion between 2009 and 2019).
105 Recovery Act, note 89, § 1001, 123 Stat. at 309-12; Brass et al., note 89, at 36.
106 In particular, it "phase[d] out for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income in
excess of $75,000, or in the case of married couples filing jointly, $150,000." Brass et al.,
note 89, at 36.
107 Id.
108 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296. For a description of the 2011 payroll tax reduc-
tion, see Dawn Nuschler, Cong. Research Serv., R41648, Social Security: Temporary Pay-
roll Tax Reduction 4 (2012).
109 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010: Information Center, http://www.irs.gov/uac/tax-relief-unemployment-insurance-
reauthorization-and-job-creation-act-of-2010-information-center (last visited July 30,
2017).
110 The payroll tax cut was first extended two months, through February 2012. Tempo-
rary Payroll Tax Cut Continuation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-78, § 201, 125 Stat. 1280,
1282. For a description, see Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., Payroll Tax Cut Tem-
porarily Extended into 2012 (Dec. 23, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Payroll-Tax-Cut-Tem-
porarily-Extended-into-2012. Then, in February 2012, it was extended for the rest of the
year with the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96,
126 Stat. 156. The estimated cost of the ten-month extension was $93.2 billion. See Press
Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Summary of The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012 (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.finance.senate.gov/news/press-releases/
summary-of-the-middle-class-tax-relief-and-job-creation-act-of-2012.
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employer-side subsidies for employment enacted by Congress are
dwarfed by the over $330 billion in employee-side subsidies. This Arti-
cle's reasoning suggests that this spending drew marginal workers into
a fixed number of jobs and made it harder for those who really needed
to work to find employment, and that the funds may have been better
targeted elsewhere.
IX. CONCLUSION
Recessions cause a tremendous amount of suffering. Many people
are out of work, and some of them really need jobs. The government
typically steps in to help alleviate this suffering, sometimes with mas-
sive expenditures. Yet, at least in the recent downturn, the response
was widely-believed to have fallen short, despite this great expense.
This Article identifies part of why the response might have fallen
short in the arena of labor income tax policy and how to improve tax
policy next time around.
The Article makes two, perhaps counterintuitive, recommendations
for how to do so, though of course the ideal size of such programs
would depend on various empirical parameters the measurement of
which is beyond the scope of this Article. The goal of this Article is to
shift policy in the direction of these recommendations. First, subsidize
nonemployment. This draws marginal workers out of the labor force,
creating "space" for those who really need jobs. Second, subsidize
employers, not employees. The recommendations accord with empiri-
cal evidence on the effectiveness of jobs programs and with common
intuitions about the problems with the economy; the main problem
during the recession downturn was not that pay is too low for those
who have jobs, but rather that employers created too few jobs. The
policies are also among those that cause the most macroeconomic
stimulus.
The Article has two broader implications for policy design during
recessions. First, with high unemployment, standard economic as-
sumptions are likely wrong, and statutory incidence can be very im-
portant for policy effectiveness. Second, though the recommendations
here are to do more or less of policies that are already under consider-
ation as macro stimulus and already have reasons for adoption on
those grounds, the political optics of hiring subsidies and subsidizing
nonemployment may be poor. To try to address those optics, propo-
nents could point to perhaps the key implication of the Article:
Policymakers should care about more than employment and GDP;
who gets a job can be as or more important than total employment.
Much work remains to be done in determining how to do that-both
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basic economics on the efficiency of rationing, as well as policy analy-
sis on the best response to it.
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APPENDIX
I. MODEL SETUP
This Section describes the key features of the labor market, solves
for the competitive equilibrium without distortions, and calculates the
social surplus from employment. There is a unit mass of potential
workers and a unit mass of firms. Potential workers choose to work or
not work. Workers have costs from employment that are distributed
uniformly from bs to some large cost, ms + bs.11' Symmetrically, firms
have benefit from employment that are distributed uniformly from bD
- mD to some large benefit bD. Throughout, we assume that the mar-
ket-clearing wage will be such that some workers and some firms are
unmatched; that is, there is always a reserve of potential workers and
potential employers.
The assumptions that employee costs and employer benefits are
uniformly distributed give rise to linear aggregate supply and demand
curves. Labor demand is therefore given by
pD = bD - MDQ*
Similarly, labor supply is also linear and is given by
Ps = bs + msQ.
We make several innocuous parametric assumptions:
* bD, bs > 0 (The most eager individuals (firms) would be willing to
accept (pay) a positive amount for employment.)
* bD > bs (The intercept of the demand curve is greater than the
intercept of the supply curve.)
* mD, MS > 0 (The demand (supply) curve slopes downward
(upward).)
In a free market equilibrium, demand equals supply. This implies
that
pD = pS
bD -mDQ = bs + msQ
bD-bs = Q(mD+MS)
or that
= bD - bs
mD + ms
ill For variables related to workers (labor suppliers), we use the abbreviation S. For
variables related to employers (labor demanders), we use the abbreviation D. As becomes
clear below, the variables bs and bD refer to the intercepts of the labor supply and demand
curves, while the variables ms and mD refer to the slope of the labor supply and demand
curves.
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Plugging in the equilibrium price to the supply curve yields:
P*= bs + msQ*
bDms + mDbS
mD + MS
The social surplus is the area between the supply and demand curves.
In general, this would be
Q*
Social Surplus = fQ[PD(Q) - Ps(Q)] dQ.
Here, the form is especially easy because it is a triangle. The social
surplus in the free market economy is
1
Social Surplus = Q* - (bD - bs)
2
1 bD - bs
2 mD + MS
(bD - bs)2
2(mD + ms)
The above results applied to a free market flexible price equilibrium.
For the remainder of the Appendix, we assume that wages are sticky, so
that actual wages P^ = P* + 0, for 0 < 0.
II. RESULTS
A. Result 1: Welfare Consequences of Rationing
We first calculate the welfare consequences of efficient rationing
and then uniform rationing, before comparing the DWL in the two
scenanos.
Efficient Rationing
The DWL from efficient rationing is second-order in 0 and is given
mD+mS 02
by 2m2D
To determine how much labor is demanded at PA, we use the labor
demand equation. We denote this quantity QD.
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pA P* + = bD MDQ
QD bD -0 -P
MD
bDmD - MDbS - mD9 - msO
mDms + mD
We then solve for the price that would cause the labor supplied to
be equal to QD:
pL = bs + msQD
bD~~ DS D-9+ bSm0bDmDMS - MDmSO + MDb-m0
mDms + mD
The DWL associated with the sticky wages is given by the standard
Harberger triangle bounded by the demand curve, the supply curve,
and the quantity demanded at P* + 0. The DWL is therefore equal to
- [* + 0 - PL] [Q* - QD]2
Bl i Height of triangle: difference in quantityBase of triangle: difference in price
1 [bDms + mDbs 
_ bDmDMS - mDmSO + mbs - mO
2 m + ms mDMS + M
r bD - bs bDmD - mDbS - mDO - MS9
LmD + ms mDms + M ]
mD + MS 02.
= 22m
Uniform Rationing
The DWL from uniform rationing is first-order in 0 and is given by
bD-bs
2mD
To determine the DWL, we calculate the surplus of the employers
and the workers under this system and subtract from the free market
case. Employer surplus is given by the triangle under the demand
curve and above the sticky wage, P* + 0. The triangle has a height of
bD - (P* + 0) and a base of QD*
Employer Surplus = -(bD - (p* + 8))QD
(mDbs - bDmD + MDO + MS0) 2
2 (mD + ms) 2 MD
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Second, we find welfare for the employees. The employee surplus
is more complicated to compute. If every worker who wanted a job
were hired, the surplus would be given by the triangle given by the
points (in (Q, P) space) (0, bs), (0, P* + 8), and (Qs, P' + 0). To solve
for Qs, the measure of workers that would want to work at the binding
minimum wage, we use the supply curve.
pA = bs + msQ
Q P* + 9-bs
ms
bDms - bsms + mDO + ms0
mDms + mi
The area of this triangle defined by (0, bs), (0, P* + 6), and (Qs, P* +
0) is
1
- (P* + 0 - bs)Qs2
(bDms - bsms + mDO + ms5 ) 2
2 (mD + MS) 2 MS
However, since the measure of firms that would like to hire a
worker at the price P* + 0 is Q' and the measure of workers willing to
work is Qs, with the uniform rationing, each worker would like to
work is employed with probability QD/Qs. Hence the employee sur-
plus is given by
QD (bDmS - bsms + mD1 + ms5 )
2
QS 2 (mD + MS) 2 mS
(bsms - bDms - mDO - MS&)(MDbs - bDmD + MDO + iSn)
2 (mD + mS) 2 MD
To calculate the DWL, we first find the total social surplus, which is
the sum of the employee and employer surplus. It is therefore
(mDbs - bDmD + mDO + ms9) 2
2 (mD + mS) 2 MD
Employer surplus
(bsms - bDmS - mDO + ms9)(bsms - bDmS - MD9 + msO)
2 (mD + ms) 2mD
Employee surplus
(mDbs - bD MD + MD 9 + m (b - bD)
2 (mD + ms)mD
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DWL is therefore the difference between the total surplus in the
free market case and here.
DWL(e) = (bD -bs)2 (MDbs - bDmD + MDO+ msi9)(bs - bD)
2(mD + Ms) 2(mD + ms)mD
Social surplus, free market Social surplus, uniform rationing
(bD - bs)
2mD
Comparison of Uniform and Efficient Rationing
The DWL from uniform rationing is strictly higher than the DWL
from efficient rationing, all 0 E (0, Omax), where 0. is defined below
First, we restrict to cases in which the sticky wage is not so high that
the market evaporates or so low that there is in fact no sticky wage.
This is equivalent to stipulating that 0 E (0, (bD-bs)mn) Let
- (bD-bs)mD0
max (mD+ms)
We wish to calculate:
ADWL(0) = [DWL, uniform sorting] - [DWL, efficient sorting]
(bD - bs)O (mD + m5 )9 2
2
mD 2m,
(mDbs - bDmD + mDO + MS)O
2mD
First note that ADWL(0) = ADWL(Omax) = 0. We next find:
a( (mDbs - bDmD+mDO + MS6))
ADWL'(0) =2a 88
mDbs - bDmD + 2 mDO + 2ms0
2m2
Note as well that
( mDbs - bDmD+ 2mD + 2 ms)
2M2ADWL"(0) = D
mD + ms
= D + 2S < 0.2MD
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Recall that mD, ms > 0 by assumption (the demand and supply
curves must slope the correct way). Hence we know that ADWL"(0) <
0; ADWL(O) is strictly concave. Since ADWL(O) = ADWL(max) = 0,
and since the function is strictly concave, we know that ADWL(O) > 0
for all 0 E (0, 0max). -
B. Result 2: Subsidy for Nonemployment
Consider a subsidy for nonemployment. Suppose that the govern-
ment gives a subsidy of W to an individual if and only if he does not
work. Suppose that W is not so large so as to make the quantity of
workers willing to supply labor less than QD. That is, the subsidy does
not influence the measure of employed workers.
To find the total surplus, we need to add together the employer
surplus and employee surplus, as above. Note that the utility of work-
ers is unaffected by the fact that nonemployment is subsidized, so the
lump-sum transfer to the nonemployed does not factor directly into
the welfare calculations. Since employer surplus is unchanged, we
only need to calculate employee surplus.
To do this, note that the surplus is the measure of workers who are
employed times their average surplus. The measure of employees is
QD, and the average surplus is the average surplus of workers willing
to work up to Qs, the measure of workers willing to work given supply
curve Supply 2 which results after the nonemployment subsidy (see
Figure 4 for a graphical representation). Given the uniform sorting,
this surplus is the average of P* + 0 - bs (the largest surplus) and P' +
o - P, where P is the price at which Qs workers would be willing to
work under Supply, (the supply curve without the nonemployment
subsidy). To find Q2, we solve for Q under Supply 2:
P = bs + W + msQ
s= P* +0- bs- W
2 
M
(0 - W) (ms + mD) + ms (bD - bs)
ms - (ms + MD)
To find P2, we plug QS into Supply,:
P2 = bs + ms s2
= bs~ms(0 - W) (MS + MD) + ms (bD -bs)=4 bs + msQ
ms - (MS + MD)
Thus the employee surplus with W is
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S(P'+- bs) + (p+ - p2S)) QD
- P* (b+ - W+ s(9 - W)(MS + m s (bD - bs)
2 (P + -bs+P+O- (b + msms(ms + MD) D
For comparison, we find the employee surplus without W using the
same method. Note that this is just the quantity supplied times the
average reservation wage, which is in turn, the average between 1) the
surplus of the highest-reservation-wage individual and 2) the surpluses
of the lowest surplus individual who is employed (0):
1 (P* + 0 - bs)QD.
2
Thus, the difference is
+P*+-bs + P* +9- bs+ ms ( - W)(ms + mD) + ms' (bD - bs) a
2~m MS(ms + mD)
Employee surplus, with W
1
2(P*+9-bs)QD2
Employee surplus, no W
1P* + 0 (bs + M (- W)(ms + MD) + Ms (bD - bs)))D
2( MS ' (MS + MD)
= 2 2S)QD > 0
since Pf < P* + 0. Note that this welfare gain is first-order in W. m
C. Result 3: Subsidizing Employers for Hiring
Now, consider the case of subsidizing employers for hiring workers
by W per worker. In this case, welfare for both employers and em-
ployees changes. The amount of the transfer W across the workers
must also be subtracted off the change in welfare.
First, employer surplus is the area formed by the triangle with cor-
ners (0, P' + 0), (0, bD + W), and (Q2, P' + 0) where Q2 is the quantity
of workers demanded with the demand curve Demand2 that results
with the subsidy W (as shown in Figure 5). This employer surplus
equals
2(bD + W -
-
To find Q2, substitute P* + 0 into Demand2:
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P*+0= bD+W-mDQ
D bD + W - -9Q2 
*DmD
Next, we find the employee surplus, which equals the measure of
employees times the average surplus (which is the same as the case
without W):
21(P * + 0- b)QD
The transfer then equals the measure employed times the size of the
transfer, W. Thus, total welfare with W is
1 1
- (bD 2 +-(P*+9-bs) 2 _ 22 2
Employer surplus Employee surplus Transfer
To find the change in welfare with the employer subsidy, subtract
welfare in the no-subsidy case, yielding
1 1
2(bD +W-P* 
-9)Q2 (bD 1D2 2




+ - (P * + 0 - bs ) (02 1 2+2




Note that a marginal increase in the subsidy can lead to a marginal
increase in DWL when W is large:
a (P* +0- bs- W) ( ))
aw
P* + 0 - bs
> 0 if and only if W < 2
which means that the subsidy is not greater than half the surplus of the
highest-surplus worker (P* + 0 - bs).
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D. Result 4: Subsidy for Employees
Consider the case in which there is a subsidy for employees. In this
case, the total surplus is the sum of employer surplus, employee sur-
plus, and the transfer from workers to the government. However,
given the money metric utility, total welfare is the same if the govern-
ment and if the workers have it. Thus, since a subsidy for employees
is the exact opposite of a subsidy for nonemployment, the change in
total surplus is just the opposite of that for a nonemployment subsidy.
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